A STEP CLOSER TO TRANSITION: WITH UNSCR 1663 PASSAGE, SYG CAN REACH OUT TO NATO

Identifier: 
06USUNNEWYORK618

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 USUN NEW YORK 000618

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, SU, UNSC, KPKO
SUBJECT: A STEP CLOSER TO TRANSITION: WITH UNSCR 1663
PASSAGE, SYG CAN REACH OUT TO NATO

REF: A. 03/21/2006 USUN E-MAIL
B. SECSTATE 045066

USUN NEW Y 00000618 001.2 OF 005

1. (SBU) SUMMARY. Special Representative of the
Secretary-General (SRSG) on Sudan Jan Pronk's March 21

SIPDIS
briefing to the Security Council revealed persistent
divisions among Members on the prospect of African Union
Mission in the Sudan (AMIS) transition and imposition of
targeted sanctions. Members spoke to the need to address
problems created by the presence of the Lord's Resistance
Army (LRA) in southern Sudan. The UK raised the possibility
of a Council visit to Sudan, which was well-received. After
protracted debate between USUN and the French delegation over
how to characterize AMIS transition in the draft text, the
Council unanimously adopted resolution 1663 on March 27; text
in Paragraph 13. OP6 of the resolution provides for the SYG
to reach out to 'international and regional organizations,'
something which the Department of Peacekeeping Operations
(DPKO) has indicated Annan is 'bullish' to do. However, the
other P-5 delegations, in spite of their rhetoric that
something must be done on Darfur, are still on the whole
unwilling to act expeditiously, and the process of AMIS
transition, at least in New York, is forced to follow suit.
END SUMMARY.

PRONK STRESSES DARFUR PEACE AND PROTECTION THROUGH ABUJA
AGREEMENT, NEW CEASEFIRE AND ROBUST FORCE

2. (SBU) SRSG Pronk's March 21 presentation to the UN
Security Council (ref A) focused on Comprehensive Peace
Agreement (CPA) implementation and the Darfur situation.
Pronk stressed the need for 'enlightened leadership,' as
demonstrated by President El Bashir in his speech in Juba, to
further CPA progress and to ensure that southern Sudan would
get its share of the peace dividend. Pronk lamented
continued problems in Abyei, including violent clashes
between rival factions and Government of National Unity's
(GNU) obstruction of UNMIS' freedom of movement. Pronk
remained concerned about Eastern Sudan stability. He
acknowledged that the LRA posed a regional threat but that
UNMIS, with its Chapter VI mandate, lacked the troops and
weapons to appropriately address this threat. Pronk cited
lack of trust between the Sudan People's Liberation Movement
(SPLM) and the GNU as the main obstacle to their cooperation
with the UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo (MONUC) in tackling the LRA. Pronk also made a
bid for an augmented role for UNMIS in disarmament,
demobilization and reintegration (DDR) to address insecurity
in the South; DPKO offered a paragraph (OP9), tweaked
considerably by the Japanese Mission, for incorporation in
UNSCR 1663 (2006).

3. (SBU) Pronk identified two goals with regard to Darfur:
peace between factions and protection of unarmed civilians.
Reaching these goals, according to Pronk, would require swift
agreement in Abuja, followed by Darfur-Darfur dialogue; a
comprehensive ceasefire agreement, buffeted by 'unequivocal'
sanctions language; and a robust, large, strong, omnipresent
peace force. Pronk made note of the 'carefully orchestrated'
public information campaign unleashed by the GNU against a UN
Darfur presence, noting in particular the notion that Darfur
would become another Iraq (NOTE. DPKO cites this rhetoric as
the main obstacle to its planned assessment mission, which is
envisaged for April but which is off to a slow start - the UN
has not yet requested visas from the GNU. END NOTE). Pronk
stressed the need for consultations as soon as possible with
the GNU to correct these misperceptions, adding that the
international community's delay in doing so had resulted in
Khartoum's resentment. Pronk declared that the 'UN was good

USUN NEW Y 00000618 002.2 OF 005

for Sudan,' given its status as the chief world organization
to facilitate decolonization and to guarantee national
sovereignty. Pronk opposed the attaching of preconditions to
AMIS transition, noting they could be used as stall tactics
by those parties seeking to postpone the peace process.

DIVISIONS REMAIN ON AMIS TRANSITION AND SANCTIONS

4. (SBU) Ambassador Bolton raised concerns over the potential
implications of decelerating the UN's contingency planning
process for AMIS transition, citing the need for the Council
to look beyond the qualifications contained in the AU PSC
March 10 Communique and to focus on its decision instead. He
stressed the need for GNU to accept DPKO's assessment team.
Ambassador Bolton urged Council Members to support a
broadening of the AU's March 10 decision in order to enhance
the re-hatting effort. He addressed Pronk's concerns over
possible UNMIS 'cannibalization' by explaining that incoming
military elements should take advantage of logistic and
administrative capabilities with a view to maximizing
efficiency and expanding UNMIS' footprint in Sudan.

5. (SBU) China, Qatar and Russia continued to insist on
preconditions for AMIS transition to a UN operation, with
China going so far as to disregard the AU PSC March 10
decision and to requst that the AU make a formal decision on
transition for eventual presentation to the Council. In
addition to a formal AU decision, China considers GNU consent
an equally 'irreplaceable precondition' for AMIS transition.
Russian DPR Dolgov added that the SC must ensure the AU's
April 30 deadline for a peace agreement in Abuja, noting that
parties there had responded favorably to the idea of an
enhanced ceasefire. Dolgov, like the Chinese delegate, noted
the need for contingency planning but stressed the key
importance of a peace agreement and of GNU voluntary consent
and cooperation for any activities of UN peacekeepers.
Qatari PR Al-Nasser was quick to jump on this bandwagon,
saying a transition would be effective only with GNU 'consent
and blessing.' He urged the international community to
cooperate with the GNU toward a comprehensive peace in Sudan
and to provide financial support to AMIS until any transition
is completed.

6. (SBU) Other Members were more forward-leaning in their
thinking on the transition. UK PR Jones Parry insisted on a
concept of operations from DPKO by the end of March.
Peruvian PR de Rivero noted that achieving peace in Abuja
could take a prohibitively long time and added that
protection of civilians could not be accordingly deferred,
citing the possibility that the Council would encounter a
'pre-Dayton, ex-Yugoslavia syndrome.' De Rivero declared
that regardless of the outcome in Abuja, 'nothing could
replace the need to plan and deploy a UN force with a robust
mandate.' He further stressed that the GNU, which could not
protect its own population, should be convinced to desist in
its resistance to a UN force in Darfur.

7. (SBU) Greek PR Vassilakis and Slovakian PR Burian urged
expeditious AMIS transition planning, and Tanzanian PR Mahiga
suggested formation of a subcommittee to enhance AMIS during
the transition (NOTE. Mahiga also supported the idea of
formation of a 'Group of Friends of Abuja,' with the UK at
the helm. END NOTE). Danish PR Loj urged an assessment
mission be dispatched as soon as possible and urged GNU
cooperation to this end. The Congolese delegate observed
that the slow pace of Abuja negotiations was prolonging
Darfur suffering. While Congo acknowledged that GNU
agreement was 'vital' to the success of an eventual UN Darfur
mission, it pointed out that without active GNU participation

USUN NEW Y 00000618 003.2 OF 005

in the transition, the international community would become
increasingly 'mobilized' to act in the interest of protection
of civilians. Ghanaian PR Effah-Apenteng reiterated his
delegation's support for transition and hope for AU-UN
cooperation, particularly in the form of an assessment
mission. He recommended an aggressive public relations
campaign against GNU propaganda.

8. (SBU) Responding to vocal calls from several Members (UK,
Greece, Denmark, Ghana, Japan) on the need to follow up on
UNSCR 1591 (2005) with limited targeted sanctions to maintain
Council credibility and to induce Abuja parties to reach a
settlement, Qatari PR inquired as to the relative use such
measures could be in effecting Darfur peace. China
reiterated its 'cautious' position on sanctions. SRSG Pronk
spoke in favor of sanctions pursuant to 1591 but recommended
that the Council designate individuals from the middle of the
list of names, rather than those at either extreme, in order
to demonstrate greater flexibility and realism.

MEMBERS ON CPA IMPLEMENTATION, LRA AND SC VISIT

9. (SBU) Chinese, Russian and Qatari delegates jumped on the
positive steps SRSG Pronk highlighted on progress in CPA
implementation, and the Tanzanian PR seconded Pronk's
characterization of President El Bashir's trip to Juba and
Rumbek as an example of 'enlightened leadership.' The
Japanese and Slovakian representatives stressed the need to
establish remaining CPA institutions as stipulated,
especially security mechanisms, and the Ghanaian PR remarked
that delay on creation of security institutions was producing
an attitude of mistrust between the National Congree Party
and SPLM. UK PR Jones Parry wanted to see more movement on
implementing boundary decisions. The Chinese rep said it was
a 'crucial moment' for the implementation of DDR and refugee
return. Both the Chinese and the Danish delegates urged
donors to live up to their Oslo pledges to create a peace
dividend in south, as the Government of Japan had done,
dispersing $80 million (80 percent of its Oslo pledge).

10. (SBU) The UK and Tanzanian PRs led the charge for the UN
to follow up on UNSCR 1653 (2006) and present the Council
with a briefing on how MONUC and UNMIS could cooperate to
combat the LRA problem in southern Sudan; a briefing was
subsequently scheduled for March 29. Danish PR Loj asked
about GNU willingness to address long-run possibilities on
the LRA issue, including cooperating with the ICC; Pronk
confirmed GNU willingness in this regard.

11. (SBU) UK PR Jones Parry raised the possibility of a
Council visit to Sudan, a proposal subsequently endorsed by
the majority of Members. Pronk said any Council trip to
Darfur would have to be done soon in order to be effective.
Such a visit, according to Pronk, could be used to allay GNU
fears that transition would result in infringement on
Sudanese sovereignty and to correct misperceptions, including
the idea that a UN deployment would be a repeat of the
invasion of Iraq and that the UN was 'paving the way' for a
NATO deployment. To this end Pronk also urged increased
bilateral consultations with the GNU.

UNSCR 1663 (2006)

12. (SBU) After much negotiation on the draft text (ref B),
the Council adopted a resolution to renew UNMIS' mandate and
to provide for the SYG to reach out to 'international and
regional organizations' for assistance to AMIS during
transition to a UN operation. The French remain indignant

USUN NEW Y 00000618 004.2 OF 005

that the transition not be portrayed as a done deal in any
Council text, largely to protect their own interests in Cote
D'Ivoire and the DRC and to avoid a financial burden in
Sudan. The Russians and Chinese continue to insist that a
final signal from the AU is necessary before transition can
be formally mandated and maintain their stance the GNU must
offer its consent and approval in this regard. The other P-5
delegations, in spite of their rhetoric that something must
be done in Darfur, are still on the whole unwilling to act
expeditiously, and the process of AMIS transition, at least
in New York, is forced to follow suit.

13. (U) Begin 1663 text:
The Security Council,

Recalling its previous resolutions, in particular resolution
1627 (2005) and 1653 (2006), and statements of its President,
in particular that of 3 February 2006 (S/PRST/2006/5),
concerning the situation in the Sudan,

Reaffirming its commitment to the sovereignty, unity,
independence and territorial integrity of the Sudan,

Welcoming implementation by the parties of the Comprehensive
Peace Agreement of 9 January 2005, and urging them to meet
their commitments,

Acknowledging the commitments by troop-contributing countries
in support of the United Nations Mission in the Sudan
(UNMIS), and encouraging deployment in order for UNMIS to
support timely implementation of the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement,

Reiterating in the strongest terms the need for all parties
to the conflict in Darfur to put an end to the violence and
atrocities,

Stressing the importance of urgently reaching a successful
conclusion of the Abuja Talks and calling on the parties to
conclude a peace agreement as soon as possible,

Welcoming the Communique of the 46th meeting of the African
Union Peace and Security Council of 10 March 2006, and its
decision to support in principle the transition of the
African Union Mission in the Sudan (AMIS) to a United Nations
operation within the framework of partnership between the
African Union and the United Nations in the promotion of
peace, security and stability in Africa, to pursue the
conclusion of a peace agreement on Darfur by the end of April
2006, and to extend the mandate of AMIS until 30 September
2006,

Expressing its deep concern at the movement of arms and armed
groups across borders such as the long running and brutal
insurgency by the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) which has
caused the death, abduction and displacement of many innocent
civilians in the Sudan,

Determining that the situation in the Sudan continues to
constitute a threat to international peace and security,

Decides to extend the mandate of UNMIS until 24 September
2006, with the intention to renew it for further periods;

Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council every
three months on the implementation of the mandate of UNMIS;

Reiterates its request in paragraph 2 of resolution 1590
(2005) that UNMIS closely and continuously liaise and
coordinate at all levels with AMIS, and urges it to intensify

USUN NEW Y 00000618 005.2 OF 005

its efforts in this regard;

Requests that the Secretary-General, jointly with the African
Union, in close and continuing consultations with the
Security Council, and in cooperation and close consultation
with the parties to the Abuja Peace Talks, including the
Government of National Unity, expedite the necessary
preparatory planning for transition of AMIS to a United
Nations operation, including options for how UNMIS can
reinforce the effort for peace in Darfur through additional
appropriate transitional assistance to AMIS, including
assistance in logistics, mobility and communications, and
that the Secretary-General present to the Council by 24 April
2006 for its consideration a range of options for a United
Nations operation in Darfur;

Encourages the Secretary-General to continue to provide
maximum possible assistance to AMIS;

Requests the Secretary-General and the African Union to
consult with international and regional organizations and
member states to identify resources to support AMIS during
transition to a United Nations operation;

Strongly condemns the activities of militias and armed groups
such as the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), which continue to
attach civilians and commit human rights abuses in the Sudan;
and urges in this regard UNMIS to make full use of its
current mandate and capabilities;

Recalls resolution 1653 (2006) and its request that the
Secretary-General make recommendations to the Council; and

SIPDIS
looks forward to receiving by 24 April 2006 these
recommendations which would include proposals on how United
Nations agencies and missions, in particular UNMIS, could
more effectively address the problem of the LRA;

Encourages the Sudanese parties to finalize the establishment
of national institutions for disarmament, demobilization and
reintegration of ex-combatants (DDR), as stipulated in the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement, and to expedite the
development of a comprehensive DDR programme, with the
assistance of UNMIS as provided in resolution 1590 (2005);

Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

14. (U) End 1663 text.
BOLTON